Direct Answer:
No, China cannot realistically cut off all water in the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) to “starve” India. Such an act is hydrologically infeasible and would provoke severe diplomatic and humanitarian fallout. However, China’s expansive dam-building program on the river’s upper reaches grants it a growing ability to influence the timing and volume of water flowing downstream. While Beijing cannot stop the river entirely, it can alter its behavior in ways that raise legitimate concerns for India and Bangladesh.
The Brahmaputra River: Geography and Importance
The Brahmaputra, known as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet, originates on the Tibetan Plateau and flows through China, India, and Bangladesh before emptying into the Bay of Bengal. This transboundary river is fed by both Himalayan glaciers and the South Asian monsoon. With an average annual discharge of about 21,000 cubic meters per second, it is one of Asia’s most powerful rivers.
The Brahmaputra provides about 30% of India’s freshwater and 44% of its hydropower potential. In Assam and Bangladesh, millions rely on its water for agriculture, drinking, and fisheries. Any significant upstream manipulation could have far-reaching consequences for food security, energy, and livelihoods across the region.
China’s Dam and Diversion Projects
China has ramped up hydropower development on the Yarlung Tsangpo in recent years. The centerpiece of its plans is the proposed Medog Dam near the river’s Great Bend in Tibet. Approved in December 2024, this mega-dam is expected to generate 300 billion kilowatt-hours annually—roughly three times the output of the Three Gorges Dam. Built in a remote, steep region, this dam could dramatically alter seasonal flows downstream.
Besides Medog, China has constructed several smaller run-of-river dams like the Zangmu, and has planned others such as Dagu, Jiacha, and Jiexu. These projects are designed to divert water through tunnels for electricity generation and then release it downstream, theoretically maintaining overall volume. However, such regulation can shift flow timing, particularly during flood and drought seasons.
China has also floated ambitious water diversion schemes—like the Grand Western Water Diversion and the Red Flag Canal—to transfer water from the Brahmaputra basin to northern China. While none of these proposals have been implemented, their very consideration underscores Chinese interest in maximizing control over its water resources.
In response, India is planning its own projects to safeguard downstream interests. The most notable is the Siang (Upper Arunachal) project, a massive dam near the India-China border aimed at storing water and mitigating any upstream manipulation. However, these plans have sparked environmental and local opposition within India.
Data Sharing and Diplomatic Engagements
Unlike the Indus Treaty between India and Pakistan, India and China have no formal water-sharing agreement for the Brahmaputra. Since 2006, the two sides have exchanged some hydrological data during the flood season under non-binding Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). However, this arrangement broke down in recent years—China has stopped sharing flood-season data since 2022, leaving India with little real-time visibility on upstream flows.
Indian diplomats have repeatedly urged China to maintain transparency and ensure that its upstream projects do not harm downstream states. Chinese officials have offered reassurances and promised scientific planning, but India remains skeptical. With no binding treaty or arbitration mechanism, India’s recourse remains limited to diplomatic protest and regional cooperation.
Geopolitical and Strategic Dimensions
China’s increasing control over the upper Brahmaputra coincides with rising border tensions in the Himalayas. The river flows through disputed areas like Arunachal Pradesh, adding another layer of complexity. Analysts warn that China’s hydropower push could turn water into a strategic tool in its broader power contest with India.
The ability to delay or modulate river flow could allow Beijing to indirectly worsen floods or droughts downstream. For countries like India and Bangladesh, this possibility represents not just an environmental risk but a national security concern. India has responded by strengthening its dam-building efforts, enhancing regional alliances, and urging multilateral discussions on transboundary water governance.
Bangladesh, further downstream, is particularly vulnerable. Changes in water volume and sediment flow could severely impact the Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna delta, which supports agriculture, fisheries, and millions of livelihoods.
Environmental and Humanitarian Impacts
Large-scale dams in the seismically active and ecologically sensitive Himalayan region carry substantial environmental and humanitarian risks. The proposed Medog Dam, for instance, would submerge parts of the pristine Yarlung Tsangpo Grand Canyon and displace local Tibetan communities.
Environmental experts warn that damming the river will alter natural flow patterns, trap nutrient-rich sediments, and degrade downstream ecosystems. Bangladesh’s delta, already facing climate-induced sea-level rise, would suffer further erosion and fertility loss. Hydrological disruption could result in devastating floods during monsoons and severe water shortages during dry months, potentially triggering crop failures and humanitarian crises affecting over 200 million people.
Legal Limitations and Need for Cooperation
There is currently no binding legal framework to regulate the Brahmaputra between China, India, and Bangladesh. Neither India nor China has ratified the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. While customary international law calls for “reasonable and equitable use” and avoiding “significant harm,” enforcement relies heavily on mutual goodwill.
With formal agreements lacking, regional water governance is ad hoc and reactive. Civil society and some Indian courts have started voicing concerns, but real progress requires diplomatic consensus and institutional mechanisms.
Conclusion
While China cannot completely “starve” India by cutting off Brahmaputra water, its growing dam-building activity gives it significant control over the river’s flow. Total stoppage is practically impossible due to the sheer volume of water and hydrological realities, but Beijing can influence seasonal flow patterns with far-reaching consequences.
India and its neighbors must treat this as a wake-up call. The current asymmetry gives China strategic leverage, highlighting the need for robust water diplomacy, data-sharing agreements, and multilateral mechanisms to ensure equitable and sustainable use of the Brahmaputra.
In the absence of a treaty, India must continue developing internal resilience—through better water storage, flood mitigation, and early warning systems—while pushing for cooperative frameworks with both upstream and downstream countries. The risk may not be one of starvation, but of strategic vulnerability, and the stakes for food security, livelihoods, and peace are too high to ignore.